"We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi," wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "and [the] Maddox incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. National Security Agency Gulf of Tonkin - A secret report reveals how easily soldiers, spies and politicians can jump to a conclusion and plunge the country into war. In fact, the North Vietnamese were trying to avoid contact with U.S. forces on August 4, and they saw the departure of the Desoto patrol ships as a sign that they could proceed to recover their torpedo boats and tow them back to base. Around midday on Aug. 4, Adm. Grant Sharp, the top navy commander in the Pacific, made a call to the Joint Chiefs, and it was clear there were significant doubts about this second incident. Within the year, U.S. bombers would strike North Vietnam, and U.S. ground units would land on South Vietnamese soil. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration Gulf of Tonkin incident | Definition, Date, Summary, Significance The battle was over in 22 minutes. McNamara was ready to respond. The World is a public radio program that crosses borders and time zones to bring home the stories that matter. Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. Both men believed an attack on the American ships was imminent. McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. We have ample forces to respond not only to these attacks on these destroyers but also to retaliate, should you wish to do so, against targets on the land, he toldthe president. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. But we sure ought to always leave the impression that if you shoot at us, you're going to get hit, Johnson said. They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement.. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. Badly damaged, the boat limped home. Thus, the South Vietnamese raid on Hon Me Island, a major North Vietnamese infiltration staging point, became the tripwire that set off the August 2 confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin. Related:LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. After a suspected torpedo attack by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats led to plans for US retaliation,the captain of the Maddox sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs that advised "complete evaluation before any further action"due to grave doubts over whether an attackhad reallyoccurred. "5, In reality there was little actual coordination between 34A and Desoto. In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. By 1400 hours EDT, the president had approved retaliatory strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases for the next morning, August 5, at 0600 local time, which was 1900 EDT on August 4 in Washington. There remains some disagreement among historians about the second (Aug. 4) incident, which involved the Maddox and another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy. The string of intelligence mistakes, mistranslations, misinterpretations and faulty decision making that occurred in the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 reveals how easily analysts and officials can jump to the wrong conclusions and lead a nation into war. The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. Subscribe to LBJ's War onApple Podcasts. THIS SECOND volume of the U.S. Navy's multivolume history of the Vietnam War is bound in the same familiar rich blue buckram that has styled official Navy histories since the Civil War and hence resembles its predecessors. In response, the North Vietnamese boat launched a torpedo. There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 What did and didnt happen in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 has long been in dispute, but the decisions that the Johnson Administration and Congress made based on an interpretation of those events were undeniably monumental. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution | History, Facts, & Significance Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. WebLyndon Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, 1964. 8. Conspiracy He has appeared on The History Channel as a featured expert. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. On 28 July, the latest specially fitted destroyer, the Maddox (DD-731), set out from Taiwan for the South China Sea. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 Historians still disagree over whether Johnson deliberately misled Congress and the American people about the Tonkin Gulf incident or simply capitalized on an opportunity that came his way. One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. This mission coincided with several 34A attacks, including an Aug. 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. While there was some doubt in Washington regarding the second attack, those aboard Maddox and Turner Joy were convinced that it had occurred. As the enemy boat passed astern, it was raked by gunfire from the Maddox that killed the boats commander. U.S. SIGINT support had provided ample warning of North Vietnams intentions and actions, enabling the American ship to defend itself successfully. Operations Security (OPSEC) concerns and related communications restrictions prevented Maddox and its operational commanders up to the Seventh Fleet from knowing of the commando raid. The Dollar Bill . Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. . THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT Volume II: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 By Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald Government Printing Office for The Naval Historical Center 591 pp. At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. Hanoi denied the charge that it had fired on the U.S. destroyers on 4 August, calling the charge "an impudent fabrication. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution . The Geneva Conference in 1954 was intended to settle outstanding issues following the end of hostilities between France and the Viet Minh at the end of the First Indochina War. One of the great ironies of the Gulf of Tonkin incident for President Johnson is that it was for him, politically, a great success, he continues. A U.S. Navy SEAL (Sea Air Land) team officer assigned to the SOG maritime operations training staff, Lieutenant James Hawes, led the covert boat fleet out of Da Nang and down the coast 300 miles to Cam Ranh Bay, where they waited out the crisis in isolation. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war." For the maritime war specialist, it is of course invaluable. Two days later, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sailedthrough both houses of Congress by a vote of 504 to 2. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. We still seek no wider war.. Captain John J. Herrick, Commander Destroyer Division 192, embarked in the Maddox, concluded that there would be "possible hostile action." Suns and Stars They issued a recall order from Haiphong to the port commander and communications relay boat two hours after the torpedo boat squadron command issued its attack order. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the State Department cabled Seaborn, instructing him to tell the North Vietnamese that "neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam] islands." Shortly after taking office following the death of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson became concerned about South Vietnam's ability to fend off the Communist Viet Cong guerillas that were operating in the country. This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. WebGulf of Tonkin conspiracy. They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. Both sides claimed successes in the exchange that they did not actually achieve. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and many more recent experiences only reinforce the need for intelligence analysts and decision makers to avoid relying exclusively on any single intelligence sourceeven SIGINTparticularly if other intelligence sources are available and the resulting decisions might cost lives. :: Douglas Pike, director of the Indochina Studies Program at the University of California-Berkeley, is the author of the forthcoming "Vietnam and the U.S.S.R.: Anatomy of an Alliance.". ThoughtCo. The U.S. ships were supposed to remain well outside North Vietnams claimed five nautical mile territorial limit. As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. Two nearly identical episodes six weeks apart; two nearly opposite responses. Soon came a second more sinister interpretation -- that the incident was a conspiracy not only provoked by the Johnson administration but one in fact "scenarioed." The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964. This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. WebTo many online conspiracy theorists, the biggest false flag operation of all time was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In 1964 the Navy was attempting to determine the extent of North Vietnams maritime infiltration into the South and to identify the Norths coastal defenses so that Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) could better support South Vietnams commando operations against the North. The first such Desoto mission was conducted off the North Vietnamese coast in February 1964, followed by more through the spring. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. By then, the two American ships were approximately 80 nautical miles from the nearest North Vietnamese coastline and steaming southeast at 20 knots. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) challenged the account, and argued that despite evidence that 34A missions and Desoto patrols were not operating in tandem, Hanoi could only have concluded that they were. Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Subsequent SIGINT reporting and faulty analysis that day further reinforced earlier false impressions. As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). "4 . 17. "11 Herricks concerns grew as the SIGINT intercepts indicated that the North Vietnamese were concentrating torpedo boats off Hon Me Island, 25 nautical miles to his southwest. Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. The Tonkin Gulf Incident in the past two decades has been treated by at least three full-scale studies, dealt with at length by Congressional committees and extensively referenced in general histories, presidential memoirs and textbooks on the U.S. legislative function. 302-303. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. 13. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. In 1996 Edward Moises book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly released concrete evidence that the SIGINT reporting confirmed the August 2 attack, but not the alleged second attack of August 4. Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. Herrick requested aerial reconnaissance for the next morning to search for the wreckage of the torpedo boats he thought he had sunk. 136-137. On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. Reinforced by Turner Joy, Herrick returned to the area on Aug. 4. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. Both boats opened fire, scoring hits on the tower, then moved on to other buildings nearby. With that false foundation in their minds, the on-scene naval analysts saw the evidence around them as confirmation of the attack they had been warned about. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations., The next day, the president addressed Congress, seeking the power to to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.. WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time. The House passed the resolution unanimously.17 Congress supported the resolution with Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. Changing course in time to evade the torpedoes, the Maddox again was attacked, this time by a boat that fired another torpedo and 14.5-mm machine guns. In August 1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolutionor Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially knownthe congressional decree that gave President Lyndon Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam. In addition, the destroyer USS Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. Returning fire, Maddox scored hits on the P-4s while being struck by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy of the U.S. Over the next few years, Johnson used the resolution to rapidly escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War. The Health Conspiracy. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American soldier casualties. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. This is another government conspiracy that's true. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. Forced Government Indoctrination Camps . Subscribe now and never hit a limit. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. President, weve just had a report from the commander of that task force out there The report is that they have observed and we don't know by what means two unidentified vessels and three unidentified prop aircraft in the vicinity of the destroyers, McNamara told the president. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident - ThoughtCo As it turns out, Adm. Sharp failed to read to the Joint Chiefs the last line of the cable, whichread: Suggest a complete evaluation before any further actions.. The ships sonar operator reported a noise spikenot a torpedowhich the Combat Information Center (CIC) team mistook for report of an incoming torpedo. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. Gulf of Tonkin incident Facts In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland, the new commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), approved of the plan, and SOG began testing 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and recoilless rifles aboard the boats. Conspiracy FACT #8: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - YouTube Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) | National Archives The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. At about the same time, there were other "secret" missions going on. Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." Early Military Career On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats. A firewall existed between covert patrol-boat attacks on North Vietnamese positions and Desoto patrols eavesdropping on shore-based communications. As is common with specialized histories -- what I call the "tunnels of Cu Chi" syndrome -- this book will tell most readers more about the U.S. Navy in Vietnam than they care to know. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. Over the next 12 hours, as the president's team scrambledto understand what hadhappened and to organize a response, the facts remained elusive. At Hon Nieu, the attack was a complete surprise. Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. A joint resolution of Congress dated August 7, 1964, gave the president authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam and served as the legal basis for escalations in the Johnson and Nixon administrations that likely dwarfed what most Americans could have imagined in August 1964. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." Gradually, the Navy broadened its role from supply/logistics to aid/advisory -- training Vietnamese and developing the South Vietnamese navy's famed "brown water force," those riverine units operating in the country's matrix of rivers and canals and through the coastal network of islands and archipelagos. Gulf of Tonkin incident, complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two While many facts and details have emerged in the past 44 years to persuade most observers that some of the reported events in the Gulf never actually happened, key portions of the critical intelligence information remained classified until recently. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. In 1964 an Ohio woman took up the challenge that had led to Amelia Earharts disappearance. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964, FRUS, Vietnam, 1964, p. 603. The only opposition came from a few scattered machine guns on shore, but they did no damage. McNamara insisted that the evidence clearly indicated there was an attack on August 4, and he continued to maintain so in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons From Vietnam. With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. U.S. soldiers recall Cam Ranh as a sprawling logistic center for materiel bolstering the war effort, but in the summer of 1964 it was only a junk force training base near a village of farmers and fishermen. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. 1, Vietnam 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 611. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in The entirety of the original intercepts, however, were not examined and reanalyzed until after the war. Subsequent research and declassified documents have essentially shown that the second attack did not happen. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. SOG took the mounting war of words very seriously and assumed the worstthat an investigation would expose its operations against the North. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. The United States Military had three SIGINT stations in the Philippines, one for each of the services, but their combined coverage was less than half of all potential North Vietnamese communications. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time.
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